Was June National Espionage Act month or what? We marked the deaths of Moscow-run spy and former FBI agent Robert Hanssen and Pentagon Papers leaker Daniel Ellsberg, and the 10-year anniversary of former NSA contractor Edward Snowden’s defection to Russia.
For gross mishandling of classified documents, former FBI analyst Kendra Kingsbury and former Air Force Intelligence Officer Robert Bercham began jail terms (four and three years, respectively) and a former president was indicted. Then came formal charges against National Air Guardsman Jack Texeira — young enough to be progeny of the other offenders, still living with mom, and imprisoned for disclosures to online gaming buddies. (Huh?)
Hansen’s is a classic spy yarn with motives and trade-craft well known to any John le Carré fan. Ellsberg is, today, mostly considered a legitimate whistleblower for disclosures to professional journalists at a reputable national newspaper — a fourth branch of our checks-and-balances system of government, some argue. Snowden’s method of disclosure, level of damage and fleeing to an adversarial nation muddy his altruistic actor claim.
“And the document hoarders?”
Their motives are hazy, but Donald Trump had a pattern of mismanagement of classified, even in office. (Remember his 2019 Tweet compromising a sophisticated satellite’s capabilities?)
Enter little Jack. His coming trial may clarify his motive, but why did he have access to intelligence on global matters seemingly incongruous with his rank (third lowest among enlistees) and place of work (New England)? Even seasoned intel officers scratch their heads over this one, but let’s tackle some obvious questions.
“Are cleared youngsters unusual?”
No. I was 20 when granted a Top Secret SCI/TK blessing (and “read into” other compartments). I tasked a satellite before legally purchasing my first beer. The CIA’s summer intern program (for college-bound children of fully cleared staff) cluttered Langley’s halls with younglings. (Secret-level clearances, admin tasks only.)
“Why?”
Clearances are like keys. They limit access to buildings, technology and information. If someone can perform a task that requires certain accesses, and they are vetted by background investigations and (for some) polygraphs, they get a key, a clearance, to do their job. Janitors, repairmen, lawyers, secretaries, executive coaches and others can hold clearances.
“Wasn’t Jackie Boy’s key chain awfully big?”
Like Snowden, he was an IT technician. He required access to communications systems and classified facilities containing a broad swath of classified. Why so broad? The 9/11 Commission findings in 2004 broke down restrictions on information moving between the intelligence community’s 18 organizations through sharing intel and “cross-pollinating” staff. (I supervised FBI, NSA, NGA, and DoD officers who were embedded in my CIA units.)
“Are there downsides to this openness?”
Yes. It puts highly sensitive information in the hands of a broader range of personnel who have been trained to differing levels of security consciousness. NSA, for instance, has checks-and-balances and an organizational “need-to- know” culture that makes it legend. Not so in some other organizations. (In my experience, elected officials and political appointees were the most lax.)
“What about overclassification?”
It’s a real issue — I saw examples in my day — but not here. The information leaked was of a nature that clearly required protection.
“Maturity?”
Maybe. The day the FBI arrested Texeira in Massachusetts, agents in Tennessee rolled up another 21-year-old Air Guardsman, Josiah Garcia (aka “Reaper”), who — like a child playing “bad guy” — had applied online to be an assassin. Army analyst Chelsea Manning, the previous “most damaging leak in history” record holder, was 23 when she turned to Wikileaks. Snowden was 30 when he went rogue.
“Is it generational?”
Maybe, in part. When I was 21, social media platforms for broadcasting information and online personas and digitally-driven self-esteem issues did not exist, and conspiracy dialogue and victim-mentality were not “viral.” Considerations of organizational, career and national loyalty shifted among new CIA recruits in the quarter century between my entry on duty and the day I left.
“Does motive matter?”
Yes, at least as far as punishment goes. It’s a false comparison to weigh Texeira’s naive exposures to, say, the actions of Cuban-run DIA penetration Ana Montez (age 44 when arrested and who finished a 20-year sentence earlier this year) or the compromises of Chinese-handled CIA officer siblings (and Hawaii residents) David and Alexander Ma, arrested at age 62 in Honolulu in 2020. Mayhaps the punishments, light compared to that in other nations, is part of the problem too.
“Is damage exaggerated?”
Not in my experience. Sources are tortured and executed, deeply affecting their families and impeding our ability to recruit new spies. Our methods become known to adversaries and critical intelligence relationships with other nations are set back. Billions of dollars of taxpayer-funded defensive technology is made obsolete overnight when revealed to terrorists, rogue nations seeking nuclear weapons, etc. Not exactly manini matters.
“What now?”
Watch the coming trials. Keep one eye on Jack and the other on Donald.
Interesting times, indeed.
Ahui hou!
J.P. Atwell is a former senior CIA operations officer. His two-decade career began as an intelligence analyst and took him to every continent, save Antarctica. He now calls Hawaii Island home. He welcomes your comments at island.intelligencer@gmail.com.
