China’s rare earth restrictions aim to beat US at its own game

FILE — President Donald Trump meets with President Xi Jinping of China at the G20 Summit in Osaka, Japan, June 29, 2019. China’s decision to tighten export controls on rare earth metals was not only about strengthening its grip on the world’s supply of the crucial minerals. It was also a high-stakes ploy to jolt Trump into paying attention to what Beijing felt were attempts by his subordinates to sabotage a U.S.-China détente, analysts say. (Erin Schaff/The New York Times)
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WASHINGTON — Over the past three years, Washington has claimed broad power to impose global rules that bar companies anywhere in the world from sending cutting-edge computer chips or the tools needed to make them to China. U.S. officials have argued that approach is necessary to make sure China does not gain the upper hand in the race for advanced artificial intelligence.

But a sweeping set of restrictions announced by Beijing last week showed that two can play that game.

The Chinese government flexed its own influence over worldwide supply chains when it announced new rules clamping down on the flow of critical minerals that are used in everything from computer chips to cars to missiles. The rules, which are set to take effect later this year, shocked foreign governments and businesses, which may now need to acquire licenses from Beijing to trade their products even outside China.

With its dominance over the production of these rare earth minerals and its control of other strategic industries, China may have an even greater ability than the United States to weaponize supply chains, analysts say.

“The U.S. now has to face up to the fact it has an adversary which can threaten substantial parts of the U.S. economy,” said Henry Farrell, a political scientist at the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies. The United States and China are now very clearly “in a much more delicate stage of mutual interdependence,” he added.

“China has really begun to figure out how to take a leaf from the U.S. playbook and in a certain sense play that game better than the U.S. is currently playing it,” Farrell said.

China’s move has rekindled tensions between the world’s two largest economies, with President Donald Trump threatening to increase already substantial tariffs on Chinese imports by imposing an additional 100% tax on Nov. 1 unless Beijing backs down from its new restrictions.

The type of supply chain restriction that China is embarking on first came into play in 2020. Washington dusted off an obscure provision known as the foreign direct product rule to target Chinese tech giant Huawei, which the U.S. government considered a national security threat. But instead of restricting American technology exports just to Huawei, the United States said any company anywhere in the world could not ship a product to Huawei if it contained U.S. parts or was made with U.S. equipment or software.

Because of the United States’ key role in the global chipmaking industry, the rules basically encompassed all advanced technology. It was a broad exertion of U.S. economic power that became the basis of a series of global tech rules during the Biden administration. Although foreign governments chafed at being told what to do, many cooperated for fear of being cut off from U.S. technology.

The question now is: Will the Chinese restrictions persuade the Trump administration to walk back its tariffs or long-standing technology restrictions, or will China’s government fold under pressure first?

The administration seemed caught off guard by China’s restrictions, which could cripple American industries. Trump threatened on Friday to cancel a planned meeting with the Chinese leader, Xi Jinping, as well as adding a 100% tariff. After stock markets plunged, the president posted on social media on Sunday, “Don’t worry about China, it will all be fine!”

On Tuesday, Trump renewed his barbs, telling a crowd of reporters and the president of Argentina that Xi “gets testy because China likes to take advantage of people and they can’t take advantage of us.” That afternoon, Trump wrote on social media that the United States was considering terminating cooking oil imports from China, as well as potentially other business.

On Wednesday morning, Treasury Secretary Scott Bessent and Jamieson Greer, the U.S. trade representative, described the Chinese licensing system as a global power grab and said the United States stood ready to impose its tariffs if China moved forward.

“Our expectation is that this never goes into effect,” Greer said.

Chinese officials have long criticized America’s extraterritorial enforcement of economic measures and insisted that Beijing has acted with consistency in the face of renewed threats from Washington.

“The United States talks about engagement on one hand while resorting to threats and intimidation on the other, imposing steep tariffs and introducing new restrictive measures,” Lin Jian, a spokesperson for the Chinese Ministry of Foreign Affairs, said Wednesday. “This is not the right way to engage with China.”

Jiang Tianjiao, an associate professor at Fudan University, said Chinese officials had noted recent efforts by the United States to restart its own rare earth industry and that they wanted to demonstrate their leverage before a possible meeting between Trump and Xi.

U.S. officials and analysts said the impacts of the Chinese licensing system would be much broader than U.S. technology controls, which have targeted only more advanced computer chips.

It’s not clear when Chinese officials started developing the rare earths licensing system. But Trump’s aggressive actions — including new fees for Chinese-owned ships that dock at U.S. ports — have given Beijing the opportunity to try out these measures.

“It scares the rest of the world how far China is willing to go in upending the global supply chain,” said Xiaomeng Lu, a director with Eurasia Group, a political consultancy and research group in Washington.

Chris Miller, a professor at Tufts University and the author of “Chip War: The Fight for the World’s Most Critical Technology,” said the implications of China’s new licensing system could be “extraordinarily broad,” affecting almost all semiconductors made globally.

The United States and China are each leveraging a supply chain that the other has struggled for years to boost domestically. But while China has spent billions on its chip industry, spurring the growth of its own chipmakers, the United States could need years to restart rare earth production.

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